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ABSTRACT
We propose SecureBoost, a privacy-preserving predictive modeling
framework, that allows service providers (SPs) to build powerful
boosting models over encrypted or randomly masked user submit-
ted data. SecureBoost uses random linear classifiers (RLCs) as the
base classifiers. A Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) manages
keys and assists the SP’s processing to reduce the complexity of
the protocol constructions. The SP learns only the base models (i.e.,
RLCs) and the CSP learns only the weights of the base models and a
limited leakage function. This separated parameter holding avoids
any party from abusing the final model or conducting model-based
attacks. We evaluate two constructions of SecureBoost: HE+GC
and SecSh+GC using combinations of primitives - homomorphic
encryption, garbled circuits, and random masking. We show that
SecureBoost efficiently learns high-quality boosting models from
protected user-generated data with practical costs.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Web andmobile service providers (SPs) are collecting user-generated
data, e.g., clicks, reviews, friend connections at an unprecedent scale.
Such collection of user data together with powerful big data an-
alytics help SP improve the quality of their services and increase
revenue, however, at the same time raise privacy concerns. SP’s
infrastructures, if poorly secured, can be compromised by external
hackers, leaking sensitive user data [8]. Furthermore, unauthorized
retrieval, sharing, or misuse of users’ personal information by in-
siders [1] are difficult to track and prevent. Even worse, users may
not be aware of any misuse or leakage of their data.
An interesting solution is SP storing protected data and only the
users who generate the data possessing the data recovery key. This
has two unique advantages: users reclaim the ownership of their
data and SP eliminates the responsibility of protecting privacy. The
challenge here is to preserve the utility of the protected data. There
should be some mechanisms for SP to mine (e.g., learn predictive
models) the protected data. Recent advances in cryptography have
provided several tools such as homomorphic encryption (HE), e.g.,
somewhat HE (SHE) and additive HE (AHE), and garbled circuits
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(GC) for achieving this goal. However, it is difficult to optimally
balance cost with utility when assorting these privacy primitives
to build the privacy-preserving machine learning algorithms [6].
It is even trickier to select and modify a machine learning algo-
rithm to significantly reduce the complexity of its privacy-preserving
version. It might be easier to implement privacy protocols for less
powerful algorithms such as linear classifiers and linear regressions
[3, 5, 6], however, extremely complex and impractical to build more
powerful algorithms such as SVM and deep neural networks [5].
Finally, existing approaches [3, 5, 6] disregard model-based at-
tacks [2, 7]. A reasonable approach to prevent such attacks is to
prevent the curious SP from holding the complete model.
Scope of work and contributions. SecureBoost addresses the
fundamental conflict between the model prediction power and the
complexity of building privacy-preserving learning algorithms for
protected data. We utilize the powerful boosting framework and
simplify it by use of random linear classifiers (RLC) as the base weak
classifiers. We adopt the setting of Crypto Service Provider (CSP)
[6] or two non-colluding servers [5]. We develop two constructions:
HE+GC and SecSh+GC, with novel combinations of security primi-
tives such as GC, SHE, Secret Sharing, AHE, and random masking.
We preserve the privacy of users’ submitted data, including both
the feature vectors and their labels, with a minimal leakage func-
tion known only to CSP. SP and CSP learn only a part of the model
parameters, effectively preventing model-based attacks by a curious
SP or CSP. We conduct an extensive experimental evaluations of
SecureBoost to explore the associated costs and tradeoffs.
2 FRAMEWORK
Figure 1 shows the SecureBoost framework and the involved parties:
the Service Provider (SP), the users who contribute personal data for
model training, and the Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP). The
learning protocols consist of multiple rounds of SP-CSP interactions
to build a boosted model on the global pool of user training data.
Ultimately, SP learns the parameters of each base classifier whereas
CSP learns the weights of the base classifiers. SP undertakes the ma-
jor storage and computation cost of the privacy-preserving protocol.
CSP assists SP in intermediate steps, e.g. encrypting and decrypt-
ing intermediate results and constructing garbled circuits. CSP is
allowed to learn a leakage function, however, remains oblivious to
users’ data or the learnt models. Note: The dotted line in Figure 1
shows the random share submission by users to SP and CSP.
2.1 SecureBoost Learning Protocol
Random Linear Classifiers. It is expensive to implement the
privacy-preserving versions of boosting with the commonly used
decision stumps (DS) as shown in previous studies [4]. Each DS
involves scanning through all possible splits for all the features in
the training data. Instead, we choose randomly generated linear
classifiers (RLC) as the base classifiers. RLC is defined by a boundary
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Figure 1: Secure-Boost Framework. SP and CSP collabora-
tively learn predictive models over encrypted user data. The
learned model is split between SP and CSP.
plane in the form of wT x + b with randomly selected w and b.
However, not all arbitrary RLCs would work as shown in Figure
2. With standardization, training data values are mostly in range
[−2, 2]. Thus, we can simply sample b from the range [−2, 2] and
each element of w uniformly from [-1, 1]. With this setting, we
were able to find effective random linear classifier in about 1-3 tries.
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Figure 2: Effective Random Linear Classifier Generation
SecureBoost Protocol. The SecureBoost learning protocol as
shown in Algorithm 1 is defined with a 4-tuple: SB-Learning =
(Setup, BaseApply, ResultEval, Update). For a boosted model
H (x) =
∑τ
t=1 αtht (x), SP learns the base models {ht (x) = w
T
t x , t =
1..τ } whereas CSP learns the model weights {αt , t = 1..τ }.
Algorithm 1 SecureBoost Framework
1: (K, E(Z ), {wi , i = 1..p }, δ1)←Setup(1k , τ , p);
2: for t ← 1 to p do
3: {E(ht (xi )), i = 1..n } ← BaseApply(K , E(Z ), wt );
4: It ← ResultEval(K , {E(ht (xi ), i = 1..n });
5: (δt+1, αt , et )← Update(K , δt , It ); // by CSP only
6: if τ effective base models have been found then
7: stop the iteration;
8: end if
9: end for
(K ,E(Z ), {wi , i = 1..p},δ1) ←Setup(1k , τ , p): (1) The key K
with security level 1k is generated by CSP (or SP if required); all
public keys are published. (2) CSP initializes δ1 with 1/n. (3) The
training dataZ of n instances contains row vectors zi = xiyi , which
is protected with either a public-key encryption scheme or random
masking (e.g., in the secret-sharing construction) to generate E(Z ).
(4) SP sets the desired number of classifiers, τ , and generates a pool
of prospective RLCs with parameterswt for t = 1 . . .p, where p is
the pool size proportional to τ , e.g., p = 1.5τ .
{E(ht (xi )), i = 1..n} ← BaseApply(K , E(Z ), wt ): With the en-
crypted training data E(Z ) and the model parameterwt , the proce-
dure outputs the model ht ’s encrypted prediction results for all the
training instances.
It ← ResultEval(K , {E(ht (xi )), i = 1..n}): ResultEval allows
CSP (not SP) to learn the indicator vector It of length n, indicating
the correctness of ht ’s prediction for each training instance (not
the actual predictions).
(δt+1,αt , et ) ← Update(δt , It ): CSP takes It , δt to compute the
weighted error rate et = ITt δt and then the weight αt = 0.5ln((1 −
et )/et ) for the base classifier ht .
Security Model.We make some security assumptions: (1) Both
SP and CSP are honest-but-curious parties. They follow exactly the
protocols and provide services as expected but interested in users’
data, hence are the major adversaries in the framework. (2) SP and
CSP do not collude as it would break the security of the protocols.
(3) All infrastructures and communication channels are secure.
SecureBoost protocol does not leak any information enabling SP
or CSP to breach data privacy, except for CSP learning a leakage
function, which is the indicator function It,i (ht (xi ) == yi ), for
i = 1..n in iteration t . Model parameters are split and distributed
between SP and CSP, hence no single party can learn the complete
model or launch model-based attacks.
2.2 Technical Detail
In this section we discuss some key details in the framework.
Integer Conversion. For HE compatibility, we convert floating-
point values x , x ∈ R to v = ⌊10mx⌋ mod q, where q is a large
integer such that 10mx ∈ (−q/2,q/2) preservesm-digit precision.
The negative values are mapped to the range (q/2,q). With large
enough q, x is recoverable and desired operations do not overflow.
Data Submission. Forn records xiyi of training data, the matrix
Z is encoded column-wise before encryption with RLWE message
packing. With AHE, users encrypt Z record-wise. With SecSh, in-
stead of encryption, users randomly split Z into Z0 for SP and Z1
for CSP, such that Z = Z0 + Z1. Users batch their submissions with
RLWE whereas either batch or stream with AHE and SecSh.
SecureMatrix-VectorMultiplication.With anAHE-encrypted
Z and the plaintextwt , it is straightforward to compute the matrix-
vectormultiplicationE(Zwt ) inBaseApply homomorphically.With
RLWE, SP encryptswt and follows the homomorphic matrix-
multiplication scheme of RLWE. With SecSh, SP holds Z0 andw0
while CSP holds Z1 andw1 (Z0 +Z1 = Z andw0 +w1 = w). SP and
CSP compute the random shares of Zwt using an AHE scheme.
Securely Checking Signs of a protected vector. CSP needs
to learn the correctness of RLCs when predicting for the training
instances during ResultEval, i.e. siдn(E(ut ) = E(Zwt )). ut is split
between SP and CSP as ut,0 and ut,1 in SecSh+GC construction. To
hide ut from CSP in HE+GC, SP performs E(ut,0) = E(ut ) + E(λt ),
where λt is a noise vector. Denoting λt by ut1 , a GC (shown by
Figure 3) computes ut = ut,0 − ut,1 (ut = ut,0 + ut,1 for HE+GC)
and returns a specific bit of each element of ut .
n many 
[2b+ log2k+1] bit 
Subtractors: ut,1 - ut,0 
ut,0 = ƛt ut,1=ut + ƛt
It = msb(ut)
SP CSP
CSP
Figure 3: GC sign checking protocol. CSP inputs ut,1, SP pro-
vides ut,0 = λt . The circuit outputsmsb(ut ) denoting siдn(ut ).
Cost Analysis. Table 1 summarizes the associated Big O esti-
mation for each party broken down into different operations.
Table 1: BigO estimation for SecureBoost constructions
Construction Party Encryption Decryption Enc. Mult/Add Enc. Comm. GC Comm. Storage
HE+GC
User O (nk) - - O (nk) - -
SP O (pn) - O (pnk) O (pn) O (pnb) O (nk )
CSP - O (pn) - - - -
SecSh+GC
User - - - - - -
SP O (pk) O (pn) - O (p(n + k )) O (pnb) O (nk )
CSP O (pn) - O (pnk) O (pn) - O (nk )
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3 EXPERIMENTS
We pick cryptographic parameters corresponding to 80-bit security.
The RLWE parameters allow 32-bit message-space, 1 full vector
replication, and at least 1 level of multiplication. Our GC-based sign
checking protocol accommodates (2b + loд2(k))-bit inputs, where
b = 7 is the bit-precision and k is the dimension of the training
data. We test SecureBoost 1 with the datasets summarized by Table
2. The synthetic dataset consists non-linearly separable classes.
Table 2: Dataset statistics.
Dataset Instances Attributes Adaboost Accuracy Number of decision stumps
ionosphere 351 34 92.02% +/- 4.26% 50
credit 1,000 24 74.80% +/- 3.50 % 100
spambase 4,601 57 92.31 % +- 4.40 % 75
epileptic 11,500 179 86.95 % +- 3.40 % 200
synthetic 150,000 10 89.51 % +-2.10 % 75
101 102 103
40%
60%
80%
100%
Number of Base Classifiers τ
A v
g.
A
cc
ur
ac
y
ionosphere credit spambase
epileptic synthetic
101 102 103
40%
60%
80%
Number of Base Classifiers τ
A v
g.
A
cc
ur
ac
y
Boosting w. DS
Boosting w. LMC
Boosting w. RLC
Figure 4: Convergence of boosting with RLCs (Left). Conver-
gence of boosting with RLCs, LMCs, and DSs (Right)
Effectiveness of RLC Boosting. Figure 4 [Left] shows that
about 200 RLCs lead to a stable model accuracy for each dataset.
Figure 4 [Right] compares amongst boosting with RLCs, DS, and
linear means classifiers (LMC) over the synthetic dataset; DS con-
verges the fastest (about 75-80 rounds) while LMC fails to improve
at all. Figure 5 [Left] shows that the model quality produced by
200 RLCs vs. 75 DS are almost identical (note 200 RLCs costs much
lower than 75 DS). Figure 5 [Right] shows that about 7-bit precision
produces almost optimal model quality.
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Figure 5: Model quality: boosting with RLCs vs. boosting
with DSs (Left). Bit precision vs. model accuracy (Right)
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Figure 6: Overall cost distribution
Cost breakdown. Figure 6 [Left] shows the computation cost
breakdown between SP and CSP for the three constructions. Figure
6 [Right] compares the GC portion of communication with that of
non-GC. Overall, RLWE+GC construction is favorable computation-
wise whereas Paillier+GC and SecSH+GC2 communication-wise.
1These results can be reproduced and verified with the scripts we have uploaded to
https://sites.google.com/site/testsboost/.
2We use the Paillier cryptosystem in SecSh+GC as the required AHE scheme
Comparing with other methods. We compare SecureBoost
with a recently proposed privacy-preserving logistic regression
(LR) and neural network (NN) protocols based on secret sharing [5].
We set a two five-node hidden-layered NN 3. The NN converges in
160 iterations whereas the LR in only 10. Figure 7 shows that all the
methods (SecureBoost, SecureML LR, and SecureML NN) perform
similarly except for the non-linearly separable synthetic data, for
which LR fails significantly. Figure 8 shows all the SecureBoost
constructions being much more efficient than the SecureML NN.
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Figure 7: Comparison of model accuracy: Secure-Boost vs.
SecureML - Logistic Regression and Neural Network.
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Figure 8: Overall cost comparison: SecureBoost construc-
tions vs. SecureML protocols for the synthetic dataset.
4 CONCLUSION
We develop the SecureBoost protocol for service providers to learn
high-quality boosted classification models from encrypted or ran-
domly partitioned users’ data with practical costs. The key idea is
to use random linear classifiers as the base classifiers to simplify
the protocol design. Two constructions: HE+GC and SecSh+GC
have been developed and evaluated, using a novel combination of
homomorphic encryption, garbled circuits, and randomized secret
sharing to protect privacy and achieve efficiency.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work is partially supported by the National Science Foundation
under Grant 1245847.
REFERENCES
[1] A. J. Duncan, S. Creese, and M. Goldsmith. Insider attacks in cloud computing. In
2012 IEEE 11th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing
and Communications, 2012.
[2] M. Fredrikson, S. Jha, and T. Ristenpart. Model inversion attacks that exploit
confidence information and basic countermeasures. Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, page 1322, 2015.
[3] T. Graepel, K. Lauter, and M. Naehrig. Ml confidential: Machine learning on
encrypted data. In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Information
Security and Cryptology, ICISC’12, pages 1–21, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2013.
[4] Y. Lindell and B. Pinkas. Privacy preserving data mining. Journal of Cryptology,
15(3):177–206, 2000.
[5] P. Mohassel and Y. Zhang. Secureml: A system for scalable privacy-preserving
machine learning. In 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2017.
[6] V. Nikolaenko, U. Weinsberg, S. Ioannidis, M. Joye, D. Boneh, and N. Taft. Privacy-
preserving ridge regression on hundreds of millions of records. In Proceedings
of the 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 334–348, Washington,
DC, USA, 2013. IEEE Computer Society.
[7] R. Shokri, M. Stronati, C. Song, and V. Shmatikov. Membership inference attacks
against machine learning models. 2016.
[8] L. Unger. Breaches to customer account data. Computer and Internet Lawyer,
32(2):14 – 20, 2015.
3The minimal shape to satisfactorily handle the non-linearly separable synthetic
dataset
Poster Presentation CCS’18, October 15-19, 2018, Toronto, ON, Canada
2296
